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Abstract 
This paper constructs a dynamic scale-free North-South model of trade with endogenous innovation. In 
the North two types of R&D races take place simultaneously within each industry. One is local-sourcing-
targeted R&D race, which results in the winner firm manufacturing in the North. The other is 
outsourcing-targeted R&D race, which culminates in the winner firm manufacturing in the South. In 
equilibrium, manufacturing costs are lower in the South, but engaging in outsourcing-directed R&D is 
more costly than local-sourcing directed R&D. Entrepreneurs optimally choose the degree of challenges 
associated with their R&D projects and thereby determine their ex-post manufacturing productivity levels. 
More challenging R&D projects require more resources ex-ante but generate more labor saving in 
manufacturing ex-post.  
 
We study the effects of globalization by considering a reduction in the resource-requirement in 
outsourcing-targeted R&D (triggered by reduced communication and transportation costs). Such a change 
reduces the North-South wage gap and increases the mass of outsourcing industries. The aggregate 
innovation rate increases despite the possibility of a fall in the rate of local-sourcing directed R&D. We 
also investigate the effects of Southern policies towards FDI. We find that subsidies that reduce the cost 
of multinational manufacturing in the South may have an adverse effect by reducing the measure of 
Outsourcing industries. On the other hand subsidies that facilitate the technology transfer efforts of 
Northern firms unambiguously increase this measure. An increase in either type of subsidy raises the 
aggregate innovation rate and diminishes the North-South wage gap. 
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1.  Introduction 
Developing countries are taking over as the most attractive destinations for Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in recent years. In 2003, China, the U.S. and India ranked 1
st, 2
nd, and 3
rd as the destinations that 
attracted the largest amounts of FDI. In a recent UNCTAD survey, both FDI experts and executives of 
multinational corporations answer that the five most attractive business locations globally for the years 
2005-2006 are in the following order: China, USA, India, Russia and Brazil (See UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/ 
2005/031/05/09/05). The recent surge of FDI to the developing countries stemmed from a host of factors, 
including especially technology improvements which lead to reductions in transport and communication 
costs, developing-country policies that attract FDI including subsidies, tax holidays, etc., and the 
emergence of bilateral/multilateral investment treaties.  
  In the traditional product cycle model as proposed by Vernon (1966) multinational firms serve as 
the main channel of North-South technology transfer. Entrepreneur firms participate in R&D races to 
innovate new products. The winner of each race gains access to technology of producing the next-
generation product and starts the manufacturing process immediately in the North. By keeping production 
in close proximity to R&D workers, the successful innovator can efficiently monitor the production 
process and make the necessary modifications if needed. Over time as production becomes standardized, 
firms look for ways of shifting production to the South to exploit low-cost manufacturing opportunities. 
Success in technology transfer implies the shifting of manufacturing to the South. This cycle is reignited 
when further innovation in the North renders obsolete the products manufactured in the South.  
  Increasingly though this type of product-cycle framework is facing a serious threat of creative 
destruction. With the decline in transportation, communication and trade costs, we have witnessed in the 
past two decades the emergence of globally-integrated production networks through which Northern 
innovators can bypass the Northern standardization stage and shift manufacturing to the South 
immediately after innovation success. This essentially implies that Northern entrepreneurs now explore 
technology transfer opportunities during the R&D stage without going through a standardization phase 
that involves mass manufacturing in the North.  
     2
  Our prime example in this context is Apple’s mini i-pod, the state-of-the-art MP3 player of its 
time. When mini i-pod was introduced in 2002, the labeling at the back of the product read “designed in 
California, manufactured in Taiwan”. In subsequent periods, the labeling for these i-pods remained the 
same with one exception: Taiwan was replaced with China! There is no evidence that suggests that mass 
production of mini i-pods has ever taken place in either California or anywhere else in the United States. 
Globally-integrated innovation-production networks are increasingly becoming the defining feature of 
multinational companies. Other examples in this context come from a variety of industries such as Dell, 
Hewlett-Packard Co., Motorola, and Philips, in electronics; and Glaxo-Smith-Kline and Eli Lilly in 
pharmaceuticals.
1 Simultaneous design and outsourcing efforts are also prevalent in low-tech industries as 
observed for clothing/footwear retailers such as Gap and Nike, and for household item makers such as 
Williams Sonoma, and Crate and Barrel. Business Week calls such firms “Speed Demons” (March 27, 
2006, pp 70-76), which often combine new R&D with immediate outsourcing and mass production in the 
South to take advantage of lower manufacturing costs and grasp the potential rents.
2   
  The literature on endogenous technology transfer and growth has expanded substantially in the 
past five years.
3 One common feature is that firms can engage in transfer of technology only after 
successful innovation. Thus, the existing literature misses the i-pod cycle  which constitutes one major 
aspect of multinationalization. Another feature of this literature is that firms have no choice over their ex-
post manufacturing productivity levels. While in the real world, firms devote their R&D efforts not only 
                                                 
1  See Naghavi and Ottaviano (2005) for an excellent discussion on the nature and extent of company-level globally integrated 
production networks.  
2  For instance, i-pod’s main components actually involve highly sophisticated products which can only be manufactured by 
established producers such as Toshiba and Fujitsu. The inventors of i-pod had a good idea to be put into immediate mass 
production overseas and thus captured the rents. 
3  Glass and Saggi (2001) analyze fragmented technology transfer to the South with endogenous innovation but without imitation. 
Glass (2004) extends this fragmentation framework to allow for exogenous imitation. Glass and Saggi (2002) use a quality-
ladders growth model to study FDI, with both endogenous innovation and imitation but without fragmentation. Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom (2005) study endogenous FDI and innovation in a scale-invariant endogenous growth setting without imitation. In a 
most recent paper, Lu (2006) shows that the firm with the most advanced technology stays in the North, and the less advanced 
moves to the South. Industries with high R&D productivity have more of the former firms, while those with medium R&D 
productivity have more outsourcing firms. 
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to product innovation (which can be targeted at quality improvements or variety expansion) but also to 
process innovation (which is targeted at increasing manufacturing productivity).
4  
  Thus, our objectives in this paper are twofold. One is to embed this i-pod cycle into a standard 
North-South product-cycle framework, and the other is to incorporate both product and process 
innovations into R&D races. We then study the effects of globalization and FDI policies on the rates of 
innovation, outsourcing and North-South wage differential.  
  Our North-South world economy consists of a continuum of industries. In each industry, 
Northern entrepreneurs participate in R&D races to innovate higher quality products (product innovation). 
In a typical industry, two types of R&D races take place simultaneously: local-sourcing-targeted- and 
outsourcing-targeted- R&D races. The winner of the local-sourcing-targeted R&D race can only 
manufacture in the North, facing higher labor costs. The winner of the outsourcing-targeted R&D race 
can immediately manufacture in the South, enjoying lower labor costs. The Northern entrepreneurs 
engaged in R&D must make two simultaneous decisions ex-ante. First, they choose the type of R&D race 
to participate in (local-sourcing-targeted vs. outsourcing-targeted) and the intensity of their R&D 
activities. Second, they choose their ex-post manufacturing efficiency levels (process innovation), which 
in turn determine their R&D technology. Northern entrepreneurs targeting a higher manufacturing 
productivity level ex-post must undertake more technologically-challenging R&D ex-ante, that is, more 
scientists and engineers employed per unit of R&D intensity. 
  In this setting, we capture the i-pod cycle in the context of the outsourcing-targeted-R&D race in 
which innovation and outsourcing efforts are simultaneously undertaken by Northern entrepreneurs. 
Participation in an outsourcing-targeted R&D race requires engagement in a broadly-defined R&D 
activity that involves not only scientists and engineers working on innovations but also a sophisticated 
management team that globally coordinates the innovation and technology transfer efforts of a 
multinational firm. In our setting, the Speed Demons correspond to the winners of the outsourcing-
                                                 
4 Scherer (1984) reports that 75.5 percent of R&D expenditures are allocated towards quality improvements and 24.5 percent are 
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targeted R&D races. These firms realize lower production costs and thus higher profit margins and stock 
market valuation. In a free-entry R&D equilibrium, it implies that participating in an outsourcing-directed 
R&D race involves relatively higher investments in comparison to a local-sourcing-directed R&D race.   
  We capture the impact of globalization by considering an increase in the efficiency of 
outsourcing-targeted R&D activity. We find that this raises the rate of outsourcing-targeted innovation 
but exerts an ambiguous effect on the rate of local-sourcing-targeted innovation. The aggregate rate of 
innovation (the sum of the two innovation rates) unambiguously increases. Also, the mass of outsourcing 
firms increases and the North-South wage gap declines. Glass and Saggi (2001), Glass (2004) and 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005) analyze similar issues, but in settings with only local-sourcing-
targeted R&D races and thus do not address the compositional R&D effects of globalization as we do. By 
modeling two distinct R&D races, we find that the aggregate innovation rate increases despite the 
possibility of a decline in local-sourcing directed R&D. In other words, we argue that the increased 
intensity of outsourcing-directed R&D (i.e., the increased frequency of i-pod cycles) is a major growth 
promoting factor triggered by globalization, which induces more outsourcing of multinational activities.
 
  We then examine the effects of Southern FDI policies towards outsourcing by considering two 
policy tools. One is manufacturing subsidies which reduce the ex-post production costs of outsourcing 
firms. The other is technology transfer subsidies which facilitate the ex-ante production shifting efforts of 
entrepreneurs engaged in outsourcing-targeted R&D. As expected, an increase in either type of subsidy 
raises the aggregate innovation rate and diminishes the North-South wage gap. However, contrasting 
results arise such that technology-transfer subsidies unambiguously increase the mass (number) of 
outsourcing firms whereas manufacturing subsidies can reduce this measure under certain parametric 
restrictions. Modeling of process innovations provides the key mechanism that generates this contrasting 
outcome. Higher manufacturing subsidies reduce the incentives of Northern entrepreneurs to engage in 
labor saving in the South. This leads to more employment within each outsourcing industry, putting 
                                                                                                                                                             
allocated to process innovations. 
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downward pressure on the mass of such industries. On the contrary, technology transfer subsidies being 
directed at pre-production efforts of entrepreneurs do not trigger this type of labor-saving mechanism. 
Note that since Glass and Saggi (2001), Glass (2004) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005) do not 
model process innovation, such contrasting implications of FDI policies do not arise in their models. 
  Our findings thus imply that technology transfer subsidies can be a better policy tool to attract 
FDI vis-à-vis manufacturing subsidies. The former brings the desired effects without the possibility of 
generating a compression in Southern production variety, an adverse outcome that may hinder knowledge 
spillovers from outsourcing firms to indigenous Southern firms. Given the importance of such spillovers 
in reaping the benefits of FDI (an issue heavily emphasized in the empirical literature), and the variety of 
incentives offered by the governments to attract FDI, our distinction in policy outcomes can be of 
practical use to policy makers.
5 In an extensive survey, Hanson (2001) classifies the policies to promote 
FDI into two broad categories. The first consists of indirect subsidies that offer exemptions from 
corporate taxes and import duties. These correspond to our manufacturing subsidies. The second consists 
of direct subsidies that  reduce the cost of all infrastructure associated with building the new plant (which 
may involve building roads and ports to facilitate transportation, providing access to energy, the cost of 
land for the plant itself and so on). These correspond to our technology transfer subsidies. Hanson states 
that indirect subsidies are more visible and thus frequently noted in the literature; however, direct 
subsidies which are usually offered to firms on a case by case basis also appear to be common.  As 
specific examples Hanson (2001) identifies General Motors and Ford in Brazil, Honda in Turkey, Ford 
and Volkswagen in Portugal, and IBM and Citibank in Ireland. All of these multinational companies have 
received direct subsidies from the host governments to facilitate their technology transfer efforts. 
  From a theoretical point of view, our explicit modeling of process innovations brings forth two 
main implications. First, in our setting lower cost production opportunities in the South arise due to 
Northern entrepreneurs’ targeted labor-saving efforts and not necessarily due to lower Southern wages. 
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When it is easier to implement labor-saving technologies in the South, production costs in the South turn 
out to be lower vis-à-vis the North. This differs from the existing literature where wage differentials (not 
relative North-South labor saving opportunities) are the primary cause of production cost differentials. 
Second, our model establishes a substitution mechanism between Northern and Southern labor within 
each industry in response to changes in the North-South relative wage. When this relative wage increases, 
entrepreneurs engaged in local-sourcing-targeted R&D (whose efforts eventually leads to Northern 
employment) raise their labor saving targets in comparison to entrepreneurs engaged in outsourcing-
targeted R&D (whose efforts eventually leads to Southern employment). This is a new mechanism that 
differs from the literature where labor productivity levels are fixed by exogenous parameters.  
  The present paper also complements an emerging literature in which contractual frictions play a 
key role in determining plant location and whether production takes place within the boundaries of the 
firm [Antràs, 2003, Antràs and Helpman, 2004, and Antràs, 2005]. In Antràs (2005), which is most 
closely related to our work, North-South product cycles emerge due to imperfect enforcement of 
international contracts. Newly innovated products go through a gradual standardization process at an 
exogenous rate, and the arrival rate of new products is exogenous. In our model, standardization takes 
place instantaneously via targeted R&D efforts and the arrival of new products is endogenous.     
  In addition, the present paper is closely related to the recent literature on outsourcing and 
fragmentation, which so far has focused mainly on why fragmentation and outsourcing occur. For 
instance, Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) point out that the existence of fixed costs and thus increasing 
returns favor integrated production at low outputs, but fragmentation at high outputs. Grossman and 
Helpman (2003) explain outsourcing as tradeoffs between production and search, the latter of which is 
affected by market thickness and the contracting environment. Kohler (2004) develops a dual 
representation of fragmentation technology, and investigates outsourcing in response to a decline in the 
final output price of a multistage industry. Long, Riezman, and Soubeyran (2004) show that services link 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Indeed, Blomström and Kokko (2003) provide abundant evidence not supporting across-the-board incentives to attract FDI, 
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production blocks, and allow the breaking up of integrated production. Free trade and the growth of the 
service sector facilitate fragmentation and outsourcing. As a complement to the above, our model shows 
that technology improvement is a driving force for the recent surge of multinational outsourcing activities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the building blocks of the model 
and establishes the steady-state equilibrium. Sections 3 and 4 present the comparative steady-state results. 
Section 5 concludes. Proofs of all propositions are relegated to the Appendices available upon request.   
 
2.  The Model 
We consider a world economy with two countries: the North and the South. There is a continuum of 





i is the initial level of population per household, and n > 0 is the rate of population growth. 
 
2.1  Household behavior  
  In each country, there exists a continuum of identical households, which takes goods prices, 
factor prices, and the interest rate as given and maximizes its utility over an infinite horizon, 
  U 





– (ρ – n)t log u
i(t) dt  ,    for  i = N, S,    (1) 
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, and log u
i(t) is the instantaneous utility of each household member 
defined as: 
  log  u
i(t) ≡  ,    for i = N, S,     (2)  ω ω λ Σ t)]d , (j, x     [   log  
i j 1  
0   j ∫
where x
i(j,ω,t) is the quantity demanded of a product with quality j in industry ω at time t. The size of 
each incremental quality improvement (the innovation size) is denoted by λ > 1. Therefore, the total 
quality of a good after j innovations is λ
j.
                                                                                                                                                             
because such FDI incentives alone are not sufficient to attract foreign technology. 
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  Each household in country i allocates its per capita consumption expenditure for each product line, 
c
i(t), to maximize u
i(t) given prices at time t. Note that all products within an industry are perfect 
substitutes; thus, households buy only the products with the lowest quality-adjusted prices. Products enter 
the utility function symmetrically; therefore, households spread their consumption expenditure evenly 
across goods. The resulting per capita product demand for each product line is x
i(j,ω,t)  = c
i(t)/p,  where p 
is the relevant market price for the product that has the lowest quality-adjusted price.  
Given the static demand behavior, the household’s maximization problem over all product lines is 
simplified to maximizing  
∫
∞  
0   L0
i e 
– (ρ – n)t log c
i(t) dt,   for  i = N, S,     (3) 
subject to the budget constraint 






i(t) denotes the financial 
assets owned by the household, W
i(t) is the family’s expected wage income of the household and r
i(t) is 
the instantaneous rate of return. The solution to this optimization gives the standard differential equation 
   =
(t) c




i(t) – ρ ,    for i = N, S.       ( 4 )  
At the steady-state equilibrium, c
i remains fixed; thus, the market interest rate is equal to the subjective 
discount rate: r
i(t) = r = ρ. From this point on we will focus on the balanced-growth path behavior of the 
economy; hence, we drop the time index for the variables that remain constant. 
 
2.2 Product Cycle Dynamics 
  All industries in the continuum are structurally identical. In each industry, Northern entrepreneurs 
participate in R&D races to innovate higher quality products. Successful innovators gain access to the 
technology of producing the state-of-the-art quality products. Northern entrepreneurs can ex-ante choose 
the type of R&D that will determine the eventual location of production if they become successful in 
R&D. More specifically, Northern entrepreneurs choose between local-sourcing-targeted R&D which 
leads to manufacturing in the North and outsourcing-targeted R&D which leads to manufacturing in the 
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South. We assume that no complementarity exists between the two types of R&D so that each 
entrepreneur just focuses on one type. 
All industries in the continuum are targeted by both outsourcing and local-sourcing directed R&D. 
Entrepreneurs successful in R&D exercise temporary monopoly power in the global market. In this 
setting, two types of industries can emerge: Northern industries and Outsourcing industries. The transition 
rates between industries are governed by stochastic Poisson processes. Entrepreneurs successful in local-
sourcing-targeted R&D manufacture their top quality products using Northern resources. We refer to this 
type of industries as Northern industries. In a typical industry, the probability of success in local-
sourcing-targeted R&D is ιNdt, where ιN denotes the intensity of local-sourcing-targeted R&D and dt 
represents a small interval of time. Entrepreneurs successful in outsourcing-targeted R&D shift 
production to the South instantaneously and use the South as a platform to supply to the world market. 
We refer to such industries as Outsourcing industries. In a typical industry, the probability of success in 
outsourcing-targeted R&D is ιOdt, where ιO  is the intensity of outsourcing-targeted R&D.  
 
2.3  Stock Market Valuations 
  Given the above product cycle dynamics, it is straightforward to derive the stock market 
valuations of firms. Consider first the determination of VN(t), the value of a successful Northern innovator 
producing in the North. Over a time interval dt, the stockholders of this firm receive πN(t) as dividend 
payments. With probability (ιO + ιN) dt, further innovation may take place in this industry. In this event 
the stockholders realize a loss of  VN(t). With probability 1 – (ιO + ιN)dt, no further innovation takes place, 
and the firm’s valuation changes by  dt. Investors fully exploit the arbitrage opportunities; thus the 
expected rate of return from a stock issued by a Northern firm must be equal to the risk-free market 
interest rate ρ(t). This implies (taking limits as dt → 0): 
N V 
  
)] t ( V / ) t ( V [
) t (
) t , ( V
N N O N
N




ω       ( 5 )  
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Consider now the valuation of an Outsourcing firm VO(t). Over a time interval dt, the 
stockholders of this firm receive πO(t) as dividend payments. With probability (ιO + ιN) dt, further 
innovation may take place in this industry and the stockholders realize a loss in value of VO(t). With 
probability 1 – (ιO + ιN) dt, the outsourcing firm maintains its leadership position, and the firm’s value 
changes by  . Again, the no-arbitrage condition requires (taking limits as dt → 0):  ) t ( VO 
)] t ( V / ) t ( V [
) t (
) t , ( V
O O O N
O




ω .       ( 6 )  
 
2.4  Manufacturing and Product Markets 
  In Northern industries, the unit labor requirement in final good manufacturing is mN. Hence 
marginal cost of production is  MCN = mNw.  In Outsourcing industries, the unit labor requirement is mO. 
Since the wage rate in South is normalized to one, the marginal cost of production is: MCO = mO(1 – σO), 
where σO is the subsidy rate for outsourced manufacturing. Following the literature, we assume that every 
time an innovation takes place in the North, some technology diffusion takes place. More specifically, the 
inferior technology becomes common knowledge to all firms in the global economy.
6 For follower firms, 
who have access to the one-step-down technology, the unit labor requirement of production is set to one 
without loss of generality. We restrict attention to the steady-states in which i) Northern producers realize 
positive profits, ii) marginal manufacturing costs in the North are higher than those in the South iii) the 
Northern relative wage satisfies w > 1. Hence, manufacturing costs must comply with:  
  λ > MCN > MCO >  1     ⇒     λ > mNw > mO( 1 –  σO) > 1.   (7) 
  With w > 1, the Southern followers can always undercut their Northern counterparts in a Bertrand 
pricing game. That is, only Southern followers can effectively compete with Northern quality leaders. In a 
typical product market, a Northern quality leader charges the limit price λMCS – ε = λ – ε  (where ε is an 
                                                 
6 See for instance see Glass and Saggi (2001) and Sayek and Sener (2006). 
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infinitely small positive number) and drives the Southern followers out of the market. Thus, the profit 
flow of a quality leader manufacturing in the North is: 
   ) MC (
) t ( E
) t ( N N − = λ
λ
π ,        ( 8 )  




S(t) stands for the global consumption expenditure in each product line. 
Similarly, the profit flow of a quality leader outsourcing production to the South is: 
   ) MC (
) t ( E
) t ( O O − = λ
λ
π .        ( 9 )  
Since MCN > MCO, we must have  ON π π > , which implies that outsourced production generates larger 
profit flows compared to local production.  
 
2.5  Endogenous Labor Saving Technology 
  Northern entrepreneurs employ Northern workers to perform R&D activities. Let XN and XO 
denote respectively the difficulty of conducting local-sourcing- and outsourcing-targeted R&D. These are 
introduced to remove the scale effects from the endogenous growth setting. The unit labor requirement 
for the two types of R&D can be written respectively as aNXN  and aOXO. Further denote with mO and mN  
the unit labor requirement in manufacturing of final goods for Outsourcing and Northern industries 
respectively. In addition to their ex-ante choice of which R&D race to participate in (local-sourcing 
 or outsourcing-directed R&D race), each entrepreneur determines its ex-post manufacturing productivity 
level by choosing ex-ante the challenge level for its R&D activity. Specifically, as the target level of mi 
decreases (i.e., manufacturing productivity increases) for i ∈ {N,O}, it becomes more challenging to 
innovate and thus the unit labor requirement per unit of R&D activity ai increases. This scheme is 
captured by the following specification:  
  ai(mi),     with ai
′(mi) < 0  and  ai
 ″(mi)> 0    for i ∈ {N,O}.     
The second derivative being positive implies that as mi falls, it becomes more challenging to generate a 
given decline in mi and thus a larger increase in ai is required. 
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To obtain closed form solutions we assume:  
  ai(mi) = Aimi 
– φi,
     for i ∈ {N,O},        ( 1 0 )  
where Ai > 0 is a constant. And φi > 0 is the elasticity that measures the percentage change in ai(mi) 











=− . for  i ∈ {N,O}.        ( 1 1 )  
The lower the level of φi, the larger is the labor-saving efficiency of the R&D technology. 
  A few points of clarification can be made here. As in the standard quality-ladders growth 
literature, success in R&D implies that the entrepreneur gains access to the technology of producing a 
product that is λ times better than the existing one (product innovation). Moreover, firms can target their 
R&D efforts at labor saving (process innovation). By intensifying these efforts, firms can realize gains in 
profit margins and thereby raise their stock market valuations. However, engaging in labor-saving 
technology is costly as reflected in increased R&D resource requirements. As we will see below, the 
optimal level of mi will be derived from an optimality condition which equates the incremental gain in 
firm valuation to the incremental increase in R&D costs.
7  
 
2.6  Optimal Choices of R&D Intensities and Productivity Targets 
We normalize the wage rate in the South to one and define w as the wage rate of Northern labor 
relative to Southern labor. A typical entrepreneur firm indexed by j engaged in local-sourcing-targeted 
R&D chooses its target manufacturing productivity level mN to maximize: 
  V N(mN, t)ιNj dt – waN(mN) XN(t)ιNjdt.        
The first order condition for mN  is (for an interior solution):
 8
                                                 
7 This is in the same spirit as Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 100) who endogenize innovation size λ. In contrast, we 
endogenize production technology, which is more relevant to issues involving outsourcing. Glass and Saggi (2002) also have 
endogenous innovation size and consider licensing and direct investment in a symmetric two-country economy. 
8 The second order condition (soc) for a maximum is VN
″ (mN) – w XN(t) aN
″ (mN) < 0, which holds with VN
″ = 0 and a N
″ > 0. 
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.          ( 1 2 )  
Free-entry in local-sourcing-targeted R&D races drives expected profits down to zero. Thus,  
  VN(t) = waN XN( t ) .          (13) 
Similarly, a typical entrepreneur firm engaged in outsourcing-targeted R&D chooses its target 
manufacturing productivity level mO to maximize: 
  V O(t)ιOj dt – waO(mO) (1 – σι O)XO(t)ιOj dt, 
where σιO is the subsidy rate for outsourcing-targeted R&D. The first order condition for mO is:
 9

















,       ( 1 4 )  
Free-entry in outsourcing-targeted R&D races drives expected profits down to zero. Thus, 
  VO(t) = waO(1 – σι O)XO(t)  .        (15) 
 
2.7  Equilibrium Levels of Manufacturing Productivity 












    for  i ∈ {N,O},       ( 1 6 )  
where Vi′= ∂Vi/∂mi and ai′ = ∂ ai /∂mi.  One can obtain expressions for VN′/VN and aN′/aN from (5) and (11), 
respectively. Substituting these into (16) and solving for mN gives the optimal level of mN as:  
  
) 1 ( w






= .          ( 1 7 )  
where ∂ mN/∂w < 0.  Similarly, one can obtain expressions for VO′/VO and aO′/aO from (6) and (11) 
respectively. Substituting these into (16) and solving for mO gives the optimal level of mO as: 
  







= .          ( 1 8 )  
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         ( 1 9 )  
 
Lemma 1: As the Northern relative wage w increases, entrepreneurs raise their relative labor-saving 
targets in the North, which translates into a reduction of mN/mO,  i.e., the North-South ratio of the unit 
labor requirement in manufacturing falls.  
 
  Lemma 1 establishes an endogenous substitution mechanism between Southern and Northern 
labor within each industry. To the best of our knowledge, such a mechanism has not been considered in 
existing R&D-based North-South product-cycle models, where mN  and mO are fixed by construction.  
 Substituting  for  mN and mO in (7) using (17) and (18), we find that MCN > MCO if and only if φN 
> φO.  Recall that φi  is an elasticity term that measures the percentage change in ai(mi) divided by the 
percentage change in mi. Hence, the condition φN > φO implies in percentage terms that a given increase in 
the challenge of R&D generates a larger productivity gain in outsourced production compared to locally-
sourced production.  
 
Lemma 2: Low cost production opportunities in the South are endogenously tied to the degree with 
which implementability of  labor-saving technologies differ between the North and the South. When it is 
easier to implement labor-saving technologies in the South relative to the North,  i.e., φN > φO, production 
costs become lower in the South than in the North.
10  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
9  Note again that the soc for a maximum is VO
″ (mO) – w XO (t) aO
″ (mO) (1 – σO)< 0, since VO
″ = 0 and a O
″ > 0 hold. 
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  Combining (18) with mO(1 – σιO) > 1 from (7) implies the restriction φO > 1/[λ/(1 – σO) – 1], 
which we assume to hold.  Note that for σO = 0, this requires φO > 1/(λ – 1). Hence, if λ < 2, we need to 
have φO > 1; and if λ > 2, we need to have φO < 1. Using (17) and (18) we obtain the unit labor 
requirements in local-sourcing- and outsourcing-targeted R&D as  
  aN(w) =  
N
















and aO = 
O
















,   (20) 
where AN and AO are constants as given in (10). 


















= − .     ( 2 1 )  
 
2.8  Industry flows 
Denote with nN and nO the fraction of Northern and Outsourcing industries, respectively. Constant 
industry shares at the steady-state require that flows in and out of each industry must be exactly balanced. 
Consider the Northern industries. Every time a Northern entrepreneur participating in an outsourcing-
targeted R&D race that is directed at a Northern industry becomes successful, the Northern industry is 
transformed into an Outsourcing industry. Hence, the aggregate flow out of the Northern industry pool is 
ιOnN. On the other hand, every time a Northern entrepreneur participating in a local-sourcing-targeted 
R&D race that is directed at an Outsourcing industry becomes successful, the industry to which the R&D 
is directed becomes a Northern industry. Thus, the aggregate flow into the Northern industry pool is ιNnO. 
Constant nN  requires: 
  nOιN =ιOnN .          ( 2 2 )  
Finally, we have 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Note that when φN > φO, for local-sourcing directed R&D to take place, we also need kNL(t) aN(mN) < kOL(t)aO(m0) to hold. In 
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  nN + nO = 1,             ( 2 3 )  
which ensures that nO also becomes constant. 
 
2.9  Labor Markets 
In the North, the labor market equilibrium implies: 
  L
N(t) = ιNaNXN(t) +ιOaOXO(t) +  nN(E(t)/λ)mN,      ( 2 4 )  
where ιNaNXN(t) and ιOaOXO(t) respectively capture the labor demand coming from local-sourcing and 
outsourcing-targeted R&D, and nN(E(t)/λ)mN measures the manufacturing labor demand coming from 
Northern industries.   
  In the South, the labor market equilibrium implies: 
  L
S(t) = nO(E(t)/λ)mO,          ( 2 5 )  
where nO(E(t)/λ)mO measures the manufacturing labor demand coming from Outsourcing industries.  
 
2.10  Steady-State Equilibrium  
  We begin the steady-state analysis by removing the scale effects in the spirit of Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1996, 2000). In particular, we set XN(t) = kNL(t) and XO(t)= kOL(t), where kN > 0, kO > 0 and 
L(t)= L
S(t) + L
N(t). With scale effects removed the system can now be expressed in per capita terms. 
Define per capita consumption expenditure of a representative global citizen as c(t) ≡ E(t)/L(t), and the 




N(t). It follows that  L
N(t)= 
L(t)/(1+η




  At the steady-state equilibrium aN, aO, ιN, ιO, nN, nO, w, and c remain constant whereas VN(t), VO(t), 
XO(t), XN(t), πN(t), πO(t), E(t) grow at the rate of n. All of these variables are endogenously determined. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Appendix we show that this condition indeed holds under φN > φO.  
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Using the flow conditions (22) and (23), the industry fractions can be expressed in terms of the 















=         ( 2 6 )  
  Substituting the industry fractions from (26) into (24) and (25), using the specifications for XO(t) 
and XN(t) along with c(t) ≡ E(t)/L(t), L
N(t)= L(t)/(1+η
S) and  L
S(t)=L(t)η
S/(1+η
S), one can express the 
Northern and Southern labor market conditions in four unknowns c, w, ιN and ιO.  
  1/(1+η
S) = ιN aN (w) kN +ιO aO kO + nN(ιN, ιO) (c/λ) mN(w),   (c,ιN, ιO, w)   (27) 
  η
S/(1+η
S) =  nO(ιN, ιO) (c/λ)mO.        (c,ιN, ιO)  (28) 
To complete the system, we need to use the stock market valuation and zero-profit conditions for local-
sourcing and outsourcing-targeted R&D. Substituting VN(t) from (13) and πN(t) from (8) into (5) using 
(21) and c(t) ≡ E(t)/L(t) gives: 
  
n
) 1 /( c
k ) w ( wa
O N
N





.     (c,ιN, ιO, w)   (29) 
Similarly substituting VO(t) from (14) and πO(t) from (9) into (6) using (21)and c(t) ≡ E(t)/L(t) gives: 
  
n
) 1 /( c
k ) 1 ( wa
O N
O





σι .     (c,ιN, ιO, w)     (30) 
Conditions(27)-(30) constitute a system of four equations in four unknowns (c,ιN, ιO, w). The rest of the 
endogenous variables can be derived in a recursive fashion using the equilibrium levels of  (c,ιN, ιO, w).  
  We label the steady-state equilibrium levels by “*”. We obtain an expression for w by taking ratio 
of the zero-profit conditions in outsourcing and local-sourcing targeted R&D, equations (29) and (30), 
respectively. This yields: 
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≡       ( 3 1 )  
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Κ measures the relative unit cost between local-sourcing and outsourcing targeted R&D, whereas Π 










that ∂(aN(w)/aO)/ ∂w > 0; thus, K is an increasing function of w, as shown by the upward sloping curve in 
Figure 1. Intuitively, an increase in w raises Northern production costs and induces entrepreneurs engaged 
in local-sourcing-targeted R&D to raise their productivity targets (i.e., a fall in mN). This in turn renders 
local-sourcing-targeted R&D more challenging and thus increases the relevant resource requirement 
aN(w) . On the other hand Π does not respond to variations in w and is shown by a horizontal curve in 
Figure 1. The intersection of the two curves determines the equilibrium level w*.  Observe that by 
equation (31) any parameter change that leads to an increase in the profitability of local-sourcing directed 
R&D relative to outsourcing-targeted R&D raises the Northern relative wage w*. Also when φN  > φO, we 
have Κ < 1, implying that participating in an outsourcing-targeted R&D case is more costly than 
participating in a local-sourcing-targeted R&D.  
  We can obtain a closed form solution for w* by substituting for aN(w) and aO from equation (20) 




































+ − + −
+
+
= ,    (32) 
where AR ≡ AO/AN and k R ≡ kO/kN.  Observe that w is pinned down by the parameters of the model. 
Substituting for w* from (32) into (17)~(20) immediately gives the equilibrium levels of mi* and ai* for i 
∈ {N,O} in terms of the parameters as well. For future use, we note the partial derivatives with respect to 
the parameters of interest AR, σιO and σO. 
        ( 3 3 a )   ) , , A ( a * a O O R N N
− − +
= σ σι ) , , A ( a * a O
0
O R N O
− +
= σ σι
         (34b)  ) , , A ( m * m O O R N N
+ − −







Next, we substitute w* from (32) into (28), to express c in terms of (ιN, ιO). This yields: 
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Note that  .  ) , , A , , ( c ) , ( c O O R O N O N
− − + + +
= σ σ ι ι ι ι ι
 Substituting  for  c from (34) into (27), we can express the Northern and Southern labor market 
equilibrium conditions solely in terms of ιN  and ιO
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+
.           ( 3 6 )  
where ai* and mi* for i ∈ {N,O} are as in (33a) and (34b), and nN and nO come from (26). 
  We are now in a position to establish the steady-state equilibrium by plotting (35) and (36) in (ιN, 
ιO) space. To simplify the exposition, we will evaluate the derivatives and intercepts as the net discount 
rate ρ – n approaches zero. This is a standard assumption commonly invoked in quality-ladder models of 
growth.
11 We conducted extensive numerical simulations to check the robustness of our results. Unless 
otherwise noted, the main results are robust to assuming positive levels for ρ – n. 
  Equation (35), which summarizes the Northern labor market equilibrium, identifies a downward 
sloping curve in (ιN, ιO) space labeled as LN in Figure 1. For a given ιO, a higher ιN affects the Northern 
labor demand via three channels. First, it raises the level of employment in local-sourcing-targeted R&D 
ιN aN kN . Second it increases the proportion of Northern industries nN. These two effects work to raise the 
Northern labor demand. Third, a higher ιN indirectly puts upward pressure on per capita consumption 
expenditure c and thus reinforces the increased Northern labor demand. To see this, note that a higher ιN 
increases the replacement rate within each industry and thus lowers the stock market valuation of firms. 
Maintaining the zero-profit conditions in R&D requires an increase in c [equation (34)]. To sum up, 
                                                 
11 See for instance Glass and Saggi (1999, 2002) among others. 
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restoring equilibrium calls for a fall in ιO, which reduces the level of employment in outsourcing-targeted 
R&D ιO aO kO and thus the demand for Northern labor. The lowered ιO also exerts two competing effects 
on the Northern labor demand by increasing nN and reducing c (via the same replacement channel 
discussed for ιN). However, as  ρ – n → 0, these two effects exactly cancel out. To sum up, equation (35) 
implies an inverse relationship between ιO  and ιN. Hence, the downward sloping LN curve in Figure 1.  
  Equation (36), which summarizes the Southern labor market equilibrium, identifies a vertical line 
in (ιN, ιO) space labeled as LS in Figure 1. For a given ιO, a higher rate of local-sourcing-targeted R&D ιN 
triggers two opposing forces on the Southern labor demand: it reduces the proportion of Outsourcing 
industries nO and thus the Southern labor demand, but raises the replacement rate and thus increases the 
level of c that is required to maintain the R&D zero profit condition. When ρ – n → 0, these two forces 
exactly offset each other and thus variations in ιN  exert no influence on equation (36). This implies that 




3.  Comparative Steady-State Analysis  
3.1  Globalization in the form of a decline in AO 
We first examine the case of a decline in AO which reflects an increase in the efficiency of outsourcing-
targeted R&D. It leads to a fall in AR ≡ AO/AN . This exercise is motivated by the substantial decline in 
                                                 
12 The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be easily established by evaluating the limits when ρ – n → 0. To simplify 
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,  and as  ιN → 0, ιO → 1/[(1+ηS)aO* kO*].  On the LS curve  ιO → ηS /[(1+ηS) ΛmO*]. The 
necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness is 1/[(1+ηS)aO* kO*] > ηS /[(1+ηS) ΛmO*].  Substituting in the relevant 
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13 Combining the wage equation (32) with the existence and uniqueness condition above implies w* > ηS. In words, when the 
existence and uniqueness condition is satisfied, the Northern wage turns out to be larger than the Southern wage if and only if the 
South is more populated than the North, a condition which has real world relevance.   
     21
transportation and communication costs observed in the past three decades, which we view as the main 
factor that facilitated the simultaneous innovation-outsourcing efforts of Northern entrepreneurs.
14
 
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in the efficiency of outsourcing-targeted R&D captured by a fall in AO, 
a.  reduces the wage rate of Northern labor relative to Southern labor w*, 
b.    increases the rate of innovation in outsourcing-targeted R&D ιO*, 
c.   increases the rate of innovation in local-sourcing-targeted R&D ιN*  iff ιN/ιO > 1/[φN(1+φO)](1 – 
σιO), 
d.   increases the aggregate rate of  innovation ιA*, 
e.    increases the proportion of Outsourcing industries nO, 
f.  increases the labor requirement  in local-sourcing manufacturing mN and leaves the resource 
requirement in outsourcing manufacturing mO the same; thus, mN*/mO*increases.  
 
Proposition 1 shows that technology improvement is a driving force for the recent surge of 
multinational outsourcing activities, which complements the explanations offered in the existing literature, 
such as Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), Long, Riezman, and Soubeyran (2004), and Grossman and 
Helpman (2003), etc. Note also that in Glass and Saggi (2001), Glass (2004) and Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom (2005), there is only local-sourcing-targeted R&D race, and thus they do not address the 
compositional R&D effects of globalization. 
Now let us identify the wage impact using (31). A decline in AO triggers a fall in aO/aN  and thereby 
increases the profitability of outsourcing-targeted R&D relative to local-sourcing-targeted R&D. For a 
given w, the K curve in Figure 2 shifts up. Equilibrium is restored via a fall in w*, which reduces the 
relative profitability of outsourcing-targeted R&D because ∂ [waN(w)/aO]/ ∂w > 0.  
                                                 
14 See Tang (2006, Figures 2 and 3) for detailed evidence on declining transport and communication costs, and Feenstra (1998) 
for a discussion of how such cost declines improve the efficiency of international outsourcing. 
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The reduction in w* discourages the labor-saving efforts of Northern entrepreneurs engaged in local-
sourcing-targeted R&D. As a result, the relative unit labor requirement between locally-sourced and 
outsourced manufacturing mN*/mO* increases [See equation (19)]. With less ambitious productivity 
targets, entrepreneurs engaged in local-sourcing-targeted R&D can now hire fewer units of scientists and 
engineers per unit of R&D. This implies a reduction in the relative R&D labor requirement aN*/aO*. Note 
that with Southern wages normalized to one, mO and aO do not actually respond to variations in w*. Thus 
the relative increase in mN*/mO* translates into an absolute increase in mN* and the relative decrease in 
aN*/aO* implies an absolute decrease in aN*.   
Before analyzing the labor market effects, it is useful to examine the change in c holding ιN and ιO 
constant. The reduction in w* induced by the lower AO decreases the R&D costs. To maintain the zero 
profit condition in R&D implied by (29) and (30), there must be a fall in the rewards coming from sales 
and hence a decline in c. 
Next, we examine the changes in ιN* and ιO* by identifying the shifts in LN and LS. Holding ιN and 
ιO constant, we observe from (35) which characterizes the LN curve that a fall in AO affects the Northern 
labor demand via four channels. First, a lower AO directly reduces aO and thus the labor demand coming 
from outsourcing-targeted R&D. Second, the reduction in aN* induced by a lower AO decreases the labor 
demand coming from local-sourcing-targeted R&D. Third, the increase in mN* induced by a lower AO 
raises the demand for Northern manufacturing labor. Fourth, the downward pressure in c triggered by the 
lower AO reduces product sales and thereby the demand for Northern manufacturing labor. It follows from 
(34b) and (34) that cmN* declines. The last two effects combined lead to reduced labor demand, and as a 
consequence, the sum of all effects lowers the demand for Northern labor. For a given ιO, this relaxes the 
Northern resource constraint, allowing for an expansion in local-sourcing-targeted R&D ιN. Hence, the 
LN curve shifts to the right.  
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  For the LS curve, defined by (36), the only effect of a fall in AO works through the induced 
decline in c, which reduces the demand for Southern manufacturing labor. This generates room for an 
expansion in outsourcing-directed R&D activity ιO and thus the LS curve shifts to the right.  
  Figure 2 shows that a lower AO unambiguously increases ιO*. On the other hand, the change in 
ιN* appears to be indeterminate. Further algebra reveals that ιN* increases if and only if ιN/ιO > 
1/[φN(1+φO)]. With regards to industry configuration, we observe that the higher ιO* puts upward 
pressure on the equilibrium share of Outsourcing industries nO*, whereas the change in ιN* counteracts 
this effect if ιN/ιO > 1/[φN(1+φO)] and reinforces it otherwise. Comparative statics results imply that nO* 
unambiguously increases. Obviously, with nO + nN = 1, the equilibrium share of Northern industries nN* 
declines. Observe that nO* and mN*/mO* both increase in response to the fall in AR. These findings imply 
that more labor-saving in Southern production and more outsourcing can occur concurrently. Also, we 
find that the aggregate innovation rate ιA* = ιN* + ιO* unambiguously increases despite that the rise in ιO 
increases ιA whereas the change in ιN may reinforce or counteract this effect.  
Our findings may seem similar to Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005) and Glass and Saggi (2001) 
in that these papers also find that an increase in the efficiency of technology transfer reduces the North-
South wage gap, increases the mass of Outsourcing industries and the aggregate innovation rate. However, 
in this literature, technology transfer takes place only after Northern production, and only local-sourcing-
targeted R&D races are considered. Our modeling of two types of R&D races sheds light on the 
compositional effects of globalization on R&D. We find that due to globalization, Northern entrepreneurs 
intensify their simultaneous innovation-outsourcing efforts and this may come at the expense of the R&D 
efforts that target the North for production purposes. Nevertheless, the aggregate innovation rate 
unambiguously increases and both the Northern and Southern consumers enjoy faster product quality 
improvements. Hence, skeptics of globalization could be correct in fearing that increased globalization 
may lead to a fall in the type of R&D that targets the North for production purposes. However, our model 
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clearly shows that globalization raises the aggregate innovation rate. This is mainly driven by the 
intensified outsourcing-targeted R&D efforts and hence the increase in the i-pod cycle frequency.  
How robust is Proposition 1 to adding imitation as an additional channel of technology transfer? 
In our accompanying working paper (Sener and Zhao, 2006), we consider this scenario by assuming that 
outsourced industries are subject to imitation threat from the South. Extensive numerical simulations 
showed that under a wide range of parameters the findings in Proposition 1 remain intact.  
 
3.2  Changes in Outsourcing policies of the South  
We consider two policy changes towards outsourcing that can be undertaken by the Southern 
governments. Southern governments may increase the manufacturing subsidy rate σO or the technology 
transfer subsidy rate σιO. These are two distinct policies that certainly lie within the policy palette of 
Southern government (see Hanson, 2001). A higher σO may involve providing larger tax breaks or larger 
subsidies in manufacturing upon successful technology transfer. A higher σιO on the other hand may 
involve reducing the technology transfer costs prior to success in outsourcing. Such costs involve locating 
the appropriate production site, setting up the production facility, matching with the production workers, 
dealing with legal/financial transactions and etc. 
  
 PROPOSITION 2: An increase in the manufacturing subsidy rate to outsourcing firms σO, 
a. reduces  w*, 
b.    increases ιO* if and only if φO > 1 –  [1 /(1 + φN)], 
c.   increases ιN*, 
d.   increases ιA*, 
e.    decreases nO*,  
f.  increases both mN and mO, while reducing mN/mO. 
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  A  higher  σO reduces the labor saving incentives of Northern entrepreneurs participating in 
outsourcing-targeted R&D races and thereby renders this type of R&D less challenging, leading to a fall 
in the relevant resource requirement; that is, mO increases and aO falls. As a result, the profitability of 
outsourcing-targeted R&D relative to local-sourcing-targeted R&D increases. The Κ curve in Figure 3 
shifts up and w* decreases.  
  Before analyzing the labor market equilibrium effects, we investigate the impact on resource 
requirements. As noted above, mO increases and aO falls. On the other hand, the lower w* reduces the 
labor saving incentives of Northern entrepreneurs participating in local-sourcing-directed R&D races and 
thereby relaxes the resource requirement in this type of R&D; that is, mN increases and aN falls.
15 It is also 
useful to investigate the impact on c, holding ιN and ιO constant. The fall in w* induced by a higher σO 
increases the profitability of R&D. For given levels of ιN and ιO, this puts upwards pressure on the level of 
c that maintains the zero profit condition in R&D.  
  In the Northern labor market, we observe four effects. The lower levels of both aN and aO 
decrease the labor demand coming from R&D activities. The fall in c reduces the demand for labor 
coming from manufacturing whereas the rise in mN works to increase it. It can be shown that cmN declines. 
Consequently, a larger σO reduces the aggregate labor demand in the North via both manufacturing and 
R&D channels. For a given ιO, this relaxes the labor constraint in the North and generates room for an 
increase in local-sourcing-targeted R&D activity ιN and hence the LN curve shifts up in Figure 3.  
  In the Southern labor market, we observe two competing effects. The reduction in c reduces the 
demand for labor whereas the rise in mO increases it. Further algebra reveals that cmO falls if and only if 
φO > 1 –  [1 /(1 + φN)]. Recall that for the model to be well behaved, we must have φO > 1 if λ < 2 and φO 
< 1 if φO < 1. In the former case (λ < 2 and φO > 1), it follows that  φO > 1 –  [1 /(1 + φN)] is readily 
                                                 
15  It can be shown that the mN/mO ratio declines. 
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satisfied. Thus restoring equilibrium requires a rise in ιO and therefore a rightward shift of the LS curve in 
Figure 3. In the latter case (λ > 2 and φO < 1)  the “if and only if” condition for φO applies.
16
  Even though the change in ιO appears to be ambiguous because of the indeterminate shift of the 
LS curve, further algebra reveals that ιN unambiguously increases (actually iff φN > φO which we 
assumed). The increase in ιN puts downward pressure on nO, and the change in ιO may reinforce or 
mitigate this effect. We find that despite the indeterminate impact coming from ιO, nO falls (again iff φN > 
φO). This is quite an unexpected result because it implies that subsidizing outsourced production more 
leads to a fall in the fraction of Outsourcing industries! Technically, even if ιO increases and puts upward 
pressure on nO, it falls short of overturning the impact coming from the increase in ιN. The key mechanism 
here involves the endogenous labor-saving decisions of firms. Increased manufacturing subsidies by the 
South reduce the labor-saving incentives of outsourcing firms. This leads to more labor employment 
within each industry. To restore equilibrium, the mass of outsourcing industries nO must go down. 
Through numerical simulations we find that this downward pressure on nO is mitigated as  ρ – n increases. 
Indeed when ρ – n increases above a certain level, an increase in σO raises nO. 
  What happens to the aggregate innovation rate ιA? Even though the change in ιO depends on the 
parameters of the model, the increase in ιN turns out to be sufficiently strong to unambiguously raise the 
aggregate innovation rate ιA. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in the rate of technology transfer subsidies σιO, 
a. reduces  w*, 
b.    increases ιO*,  
c.   increases ιN* iff ιN/ιO > (1+φN )/[φN(1+φO)(1 -σιO)], 
d.   increases ιA* if σιO < φO/(1 + φO),  
                                                 
16 Note that with φN > φO  we are essentially looking at a particular range φN > φO > 1 –  [1 /(1 + φN)] for this condition to hold. 
     27
e.    increases nO*,  
f. increases  mN, leaves mO unchanged. 
 
  First, we investigate the impact on w*. An increase in σιO directly raises the relative profitability 
of outsourcing-targeted vs. local-sourcing-targeted R&D; hence the Κ curve in Figure 4 shifts up and w* 
decreases. Before analyzing the labor market equilibrium effects, we examine the changes in resource 
requirements. The lower w* reduces the labor saving incentives of entrepreneurs engaged in local-
sourcing-targeted R&D, rendering this type of R&D less challenging. In other words, mN  increases and aN 
falls. On the other hand, the change in σιO does not affect mO and aO. It is again useful to investigate the 
impact on c, holding ιN and ιO constant. The lower w* increases the profitability of both types of R&D, 
and restoring the zero profit condition puts downward pressure on c.  
  In the Northern labor market, we observe three effects. The fall in aN induced by the lower w* 
reduces the labor demand coming from outsourcing-targeted R&D. The lower c reduces the labor demand 
coming from manufacturing, whereas the higher mN works against it. It can be shown that cmN declines. 
Consequently, the aggregate demand for Northern labor declines via both R&D and manufacturing 
channels. For a given ιO, the relaxation in the Northern labor constraint creates room for an increase in ιN. 
As a result, the LN curve shifts to the right in Figure 4. In the Southern labor market, the decline in c is 
the only distortion. The lower c reduces the labor demand in manufacturing and relaxes the Southern 
labor constraint. As a result, ιO increases and the LS curve shifts to the right in Figure 4. 
  It can be seen graphically from Figure 4 that ιO unambiguously increases. Further algebra reveals 
that ιN increases if and only if ιN/ιO > (1+φN )/[φN(1+φO)(1 – σιO)]. The increase in ιO raises nO whereas 
the change coming from ιN is indeterminate. In the Appendix we show that nO increases unambiguously. 
In addition, we find that ιA increases if  σιO is  sufficiently low. 
  What are the policy implications of Propositions 2 and 3? Higher technology-transfer subsidies in 
the form of an increase in σιO certainly attract FDI by increasing the frequency of i-pod product cycles ιO 
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and the mass of outsourcing industries nO. When one considers the possibility of knowledge spillovers 
from Outsourcing industries to indigenous Southern firms, the positive effects of higher nO are magnified. 
In fact, these spillovers can be seen explicitly when we allow for imitation  0 µ >  (see Sener and Zhao, 
2006). Then  O n µ  measures the flow of North-South knowledge spillovers that occurs through the 
Southern production variety channel nO. Extensive numerical simulations implied that when µ > 0, the 
main results in Proposition 3 remain intact.  
  On the other hand higher manufacturing subsidies in the form of an increase in σO may not be the 
optimal policy to attract FDI. This increase raises the frequency of i-pod cycles ιO only under certain 
parametric restrictions and leads to a fall in nO when ρ - n is below a critical level. Thus, such a policy 
change may limit the flow of North-South knowledge spillovers. When  we add imitation µ > 0, 
numerical simulations imply that a higher σO decreases nO if either µ or ρ - n  is below a critical level, 
confirming the analytical results. To sum up, our model suggests that technology transfer subsidies 
dominate production subsidies when the South’s objective is to increase the extent of production variety 
in its borders and realize the associated knowledge spillovers.  Given the existence of direct and indirect 
subsidies to attract FDI as documented by Hanson (2001), our theoretical model provides practical 
guidance to the policy maker who must choose between different policies to generate spillovers. In 
practice, the direct policy may take the form of subsidies given to multinationals to assist with 
infrastructure, plant set up and education and training of workers, whereas indirect  subsidies may involve 
corporate tax exemptions and import duty reductions. 
Observe that modeling of process innovations provides the key mechanism that generates the 
contrasting outcomes between the two subsidies. Higher manufacturing subsidies reduce the incentives of 
Northern entrepreneurs to engage in labor saving in the South. This leads to more employment within 
each outsourcing industry, putting downward pressure on the mass of outsourcing industries. 
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5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we incorporated what we called the i-pod cycle into the traditional product cycle setting. To 
this end, we categorized R&D races into two: outsourcing-targeted- and local-sourcing-targeted. 
Entrepreneurs target their eventual location of production by choosing which R&D race to participate in. 
R&D involves both product and process innovation. We captured the i-pod cycle in the context of 
outsourcing-targeted R&D races in which participants combine their innovation activities with 
simultaneous outsourcing efforts. We used the model to examine the effects of globalization and Southern 
FDI policies on wages, R&D intensities and the fraction of Outsourcing industries.  
We find that globalization in the form of an improvement in the efficiency of outsourcing-
targeted R&D raises the aggregate rate of innovation while reducing the North-South wage gap. We also 
identify the compositional effects of globalization on R&D, by finding that the intensity of outsourcing-
directed R&D increases whereas the intensity of local-sourcing targeted R&D moves in an ambiguous 
direction. These findings imply that the higher frequency of i-pod cycles through increased outsourcing-
targeted R&D efforts of Northern entrepreneurs is a robust factor that fosters aggregate innovation.  
We argue that from the South’s perspective, technology transfer subsidies can be a more desirable 
option vis-à-vis manufacturing subsidies to attract FDI. Manufacturing subsidies directly distort the labor 
saving incentives of outsourcing firms and thus lead to more employment within each Outsourcing 
industry, which then puts downward pressure on the mass of Outsourcing industries. This adverse effect 
is more pronounced when the imitation rate and/or discount rate is lower and can lead to a fall in the 
equilibrium fraction of Outsourcing industries. In addition, the production variety compression in the 
South can have further adverse effects as it reduces the extent of North-South knowledge spillovers. 
We have only looked into some aspects of the globalization process. Other aspects such as tariff 
reductions are also important and their impacts remain to be analyzed. One might also incorporate 
contractual frictions to the product cycle setting along the lines of Antras (2005) and Antras and Helpman 
(2004), and model the in-house production vs. arm’s length contracting decisions of multinational firms. 
In this paper, we have modeled all outsourcing as taking place within the boundaries of the firm or being 
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outsourced to Southern manufacturers in a frictionless contracting environment. Combining our focus on 
technology choices with Antràs’ (2005) contractual frictions is a fruitful undertaking, which we leave for 
further research.  
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